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Do instances of public gun violence increase support for Radical Right Parties?
Using a pseudo-experimental design, this study investigates the impact of shootings
in Sweden 2011-2018 on support for the Sweden Democrats. Using GIS techniques
to combine both election results and survey data with police data on shootings,
shootings show no consistent political effects. While there are some methodolog-
ical caveats, the results might reflect that perceptions and fear of crime are more
important determinants of political attitudes than actual crime.
1 Introduction
An integral message of radical right and populist parties is that violent crime is getting
out of control, and that immigration is the cause of it. Studies of electorates in a wide
range of countries have consequently shown that feelings of insecurity and threat are
consistent predictors of votes for populist or anti-immigration parties.
However, the connection between actual crime and political outcomes is less clear.
For instance, while a central part of Donald Trump’s message is that crime is on the
rise, violent crime in the United States has decreased over the last decades. Nevertheless,
surveys show that voters do believe that crime is increasing (Pew Research 2019).
This begs the question of to what extent voters respond to actual levels of violent
crime. Are episodes of violent crime met with increased support for a family of parties
that have made opposition to such crime a centerpiece of their platform, or is demand
for such parties more driven by a general feeling of threat?
In this paper, I employ a pseudo-experimental design to estimate the causal impact of
gun violence related to organized crime on support for the Sweden Democrats in Swedish
parliamentary elections. Exploiting the fact that shootings are likely to be randomly
distributed in relation to the election, areas where a shooting took place just after an
election can be thought of as a control group to areas where shootings happened just
before an election.
Sweden is an interesting test case, given that the last decade has seen both the entry
of the Sweden Democrats into parliament, as well as an uptick in killings in the world
of organized crime. Many of them has happened in public, with military-grade weapons,
several times injuring bystanders. As a result, these episodes have been highly discussed
in national media, and as many of the perpetrators have been immigrants or decendants
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of immigrants, the shootings have also been used in the rhetoric of the Sweden Democrats.
However, while the pseudo-experimental design is validated by balance tests, the
results of the analyses show that there is no consistent impact of shootings on electoral
behavior. Voters exposed to shootings in their immediate vicinity just before the election
are not more likely to support the Sweden Democrats than those not exposed to shootings.
That fears of crime is a consistent predictor of support for the Sweden Democrats does
thus not mean that actual crime serves the same function.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In the theoretical section, I review the
literature on crime and support for the populist and radical right, as well as the case.
The methods and data section describes pseudo-experimental design and data used. The
third section presents the result of the main analysis, as well as auxillary analyses that
corroborate the main findings. The final section concludes.
2 Theory and hypothesis
One of the most important trends in European politics the last decades is the emergence
and spectacular success of the ”radical right,” a loosely defined group of parties that can
be said to contain parties such as the French Front National, the Italian Lega and the
Austrian Freedom Party (Rydgren 2008). While there has been much discussion about
the similarities and differences between these parties and if they really constitute a family,
the key tenet in the message of virtually all these parties is opposition to immigration.
In spite of the disproportionate attention given to the study of radical right parties,
most of the research point to the fact that their voters behave as voters in general do:
they support the party whose policy positions are closest to themselves, on issues they
find important (Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2000). And the most important
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issue that determines support for these parties is, naturally, resistance to immigration
(Rydgren 2008; Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2000; Ivarsflaten 2008; Allen 2017).
This in turn leads into the question of what causes resistance and openness to im-
migration. Much research has been devoted to investigating whether economic hardship
and competition causes anti-immigration sentiments, and in turn, votes for the radical
right. While there is some evidence that this might be the case (Arzheimer 2009; Dal Bó
et al. 2018), in general research suggests that the perception of immigration’s impact of
the economy in general matter more than changing personal circumstances (Hainmueller
and Hopkins 2014).
The main message of the radical right is that the nation is under threat, from corrupt
and globalist elites within, and immigrants outside. Violent, criminal immigrants are the
embodiement of this message, threatening the security of citizens. Psychological research
has also shown that feelings of threat increase ethnocentrism and xenophobia (Huddy
et al. 2005). A political message against immigration, that plays up threats, is thus
reinforced by itself. Anti-immigrant sentiments leads to feelings of greater threat, which
in turn increases anti-immigrant sentiments.
Issues of law and order as well as immigration are generally “owned” by the right
(Seeberg 2017). Increasing salience of these issues are therefore likely to lead to a corre-
sponding increase in support for right and radical right parties. High-profile crimes that
garner attention in national media, or crimes that are highly visible to the individual,
could elevate the issue on voters’ agenda.
Examples of how radical right politicians connect crime to immigration abound. When
Donald Trump announced he was for running for president of the United States, he
proclaimed that “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best... They’re
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sending people who have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us.
They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume,
are good people.” Similar sentiments are common in Europe. After a brutal murder early
2018, the leader of Italy’s Lega, Matteo Salvini stated that “The moral responsibility of
every incident of violence that happens in Italy is that of those who have filled it with
illegal immigrants” (Local 2018). And in a recent State of the Union speech, Hungary’s
Viktor Orban claimed that “Migration boosts crime - in particular, crimes against women
- and spreads the disease of terrorism among us” (Post 2019).
2.1 Previous research on crime and radical right support
Messages that connect immigration to crime are thus common among radical right parties.
This does however not necessarily imply that actual crime are related to support for the
radical right. Perceptions about the prevalence of crime, and worries over it, might be
driven by other factors, such as media coverage. Nor does exposure to crime for the
individual need be predictive of perceptions of crime more generally. For instance, the
link between objective immigration rates and support for anti-immigration parties is
weaker than one might expect, finding support in some studies and not in others (Dinas
and Spanje 2011).
Several intertwined strands of literature have bearing on the matter at hand. A large
body of research deals with attitudes: the link between crime rates on attitudes towards
immigration; the link between immigration rates and worries for crime, the link between
worries for crime and attitudes towards immigration and vice versa; the effects of news
reporting on attitudes towards immigration; the effect of crime levels on the saliency of
the immigration issue, and so on.
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In general, worries about crime is is related to worries about, and opposition to,
immigration (Fitzgerald, Curtis, and Corliss 2012). Influx of immigrants can also lead
to stronger fears for crime (even if crime levels are not affected) (Nunziata 2015). But
there is also experimental evidence that safety concerns are less important than a sense
of cultural threat in determining attitudes towards immigrants (Sniderman, Hagendoorn,
and Prior 2004), and observational data from the United States that fail to find a link
between local crime rates and anti-immigrant sentiments (Hopkins 2010).
Another set of studies instead focus on voting and voting intentions as outcomes to
be explained. A review of parliamentary elections in Europe (Smith 2010) did find that
radical right parties fared better when crime levels were higher, especially if immigration
also was high. A study from the Netherlands found that higher local crime rates were
associated with an increased probability of voting for the List Pim Fortuyn among voters
that had anti-immigrant attitudes, and conversely that immigration rates were associated
with more voting for the same party among voters who were “tough on crime” (Dinas
and Spanje 2011). Similarly, voters who believed that immigration increased crime were
more likely to vote for radical right parties in a study of six European countries (Rydgren
2008). Media exposure to news about crime and immigration were associated with higher
likelihoods of voting for anti-immigration parties, although issues of causality is hard to
sort out (Burscher, Spanje, and Vreese 2015).
On the other hand, there are also studies that do not find connections between radical
right support and the saliency of the crime issue (Dennison 2019), or between media
reporting that links immigration to crime (in contrast to immigration news in general)
(Damstra et al. 2019). A sceptical perspective is offered by Cas Mudde, who notes that
while crime is a high priority for supporters of the radical right, it “seems to play only
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a marginal role in motivating people to actually vote for a populist radical right party,”
taking a backseat to “xenophobia and political resentment” (Mudde 2007:224).
2.2 Previous research on effects of shootings
Existing research on the effects of shootings is naturally focused on the United States,
where mass shootings with many fatalities are comparatively common. Benjamin New-
man and Todd Hartman are the authors of a study similar to the present one, where
respondents that live in proximity to a mass shooting are compared to respondents that
do not. In the original study (Newman and Hartman 2017), they find that such exposure
increases support for gun control. However, David Barney and Brian Schaffner (2018)
have put forth valid methodological criticism that question the findings, instead find-
ing that if there is any effect, it is conditional on party identification, with Democrats
becoming more supportive of gun control, and Republicans less.
The polarizing effect of shootings is found also by Hasin Yousaf (2018), in an ambi-
tious study. Using difference-in-difference estimation strategies, Yousaf also find that on
average, Republicans fare worse in subsequent elections in districts that experience mass
shootings.
In contrast, a recent study found no effect of school shootings in the US, either on
voter registration, turnout or electoral outcomes (Hassell, Holbein, and Baldwin 2020).
Extreme events leading to the death of innocents, even children, does apparently not
always have political consequences.
It is important to keep in mind the political context when interpreting the findings.
While theory suggests that exposure to crime should increase saliency of the law and order
issue and benefit parties that are perceived to be strong in that area, mass shootings in the
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United States are often framed differently. In public debate after shootings, the primary
issue is often perceived to be access to guns, rather than crime in general, since many
of the high-profile perpetrators have no prior convictions. Importantly, Yousaf exclude
familial shootings and “felony mass shootings,” meaning shootings that are connected
to crime in some way, such as criminal competition or armed robbery. Such shootings
that are perceived to be connected to organized crime and gangs could most likely have
different effects than the more “random” public mass shootings common to the United
States.
2.3 Shootings in Sweden
The case in this study is Sweden, a country in the intersection of three different trends.
First, while levels of violence are low in a global perspective, deadly violence has been on
the rise in the last few years, especially gun violence, which is now high in a European
perspective (NCP 2019; Sturup, Gerell, and Rostami 2019). Second, Sweden has had one
of the highest levels of asylum immigration in Europe, especially in relation to the 2015
refugee crisis. Today, 19.1 percent of the Swedish population was born abroad, compared
to 13.7 percent in the United States. The change from what was often seen as “small,
homogenous country” is stark; the proportion foreign-born was 11.3 percent as recently
as the year 2000.
Large immigration has provided a basis for the third important trend: the meteoric
rise of the Sweden Democrats, who entered the Riksdag in 2010, and currently hold
the third most seats. Sweden was for long an exception to the European rule, where
radical right parties were represented in most national parliaments, but not in Sweden.
The reasons, scholars have argued, was that the immigration issue was long kept off the
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politial agenda (Dahlström and Esaiasson 2013). In contrast, it has now been one of the
most salient issues for years.
The ground is thus ripe for the Sweden Democrats to politicize shootings. On their
website state they state that “Our country is ill. Women, children and elders are afraid
to go out at night. Rival gangs from the suburbs fight in the streets... As a result of
the uncontrolled immigration, terrorists with combat experience walk the streets and
exploit our welfare- and asylum system” (Sweden Democrats 2019). While the Sweden
Democrats more than any other party connect the issue to immigration, high-profile
shootings have also been used by the Conservative party to attack the Social Democratic
government. The prime minister, in turn, recently tried to tie shootings to the use of
narcotics by rich youth in wealthy suburbs.
Shootings mainly happen in the three most populous cities, and are usually related to
criminal competition by rival gangs (Sturup, Gerell, and Rostami 2019). The targets of
shootings are often criminals themselves: bystanders are seldom killed in the shootings,
although there are exceptions. In one of the most violent episodes, gunmen in 2015
opened fire with automatic weapons on a restaurant in Gothenburg, killing a leader of a
rival gang, but also a local boy, and injuring many others.
Information about the ethnic background of criminals is in itself highly politicized in
Sweden, and statistics are not readily available. In a debate article in 2018, the leader
of the Sweden Democrats wrote “the connection between immigration and crime has
been so sensitive that it has been the subject of thought policing. They have covered
up and kept statistics secret.” (Åkesson 2018). Surveys further reveal that the public’s
confidence in news reporting is lowest specifically in the areas of immigration and crime,
with a majority agreeing the media “doesn’t tell the whole truth about immigration”
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(Andersson 2017).
Many of the criminal gangs that perpetrate shootings have a disproportionate num-
ber of members that are immigrants themselves, or are children of immigrants. In an
investigation of 192 gang members in Stockholm, the newspaper Expressen found that
82 percent were immigrants or had two immigrant parents (Petersson 2017).
In terms of issue ownership, the Sweden Democrats are generally seen to have the best
policy on immigration. On law and order, the Conservative party are strongest. Sweden
Democrats here fare about as well as the Social Democrats (Johan Martinsson 2019).
2.4 Hypothesis
Several political actors have tried to politicize shootings in Sweden. But given the strong
perceived connection between this type of violence and immigration, the issue ownership
of the Sweden Democrats on the immigration issue and their strong stance on law and
order, the hypothesis is that voters who live in close proximity to shootings will increase
their support of the Sweden Democrats.
3 Empirical strategy and data
The main challenge to identifying the political effects of shootings is that they are not
randomly distributed. Far from it - shootings related to crime to a higher degree happen
in cities, and in disadvantaged neighborhoods (Sturup, Rostami, et al. 2018). Simply
comparing areas where shootings took place to areas where they did not will undoubtedly
result in biased estimates.
To solve this problem Hasin Yousaf (2018) use a difference-in-difference design, where
counties that experience mass shootings are compared to other (similar) counties before
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and after the shooting. Included in the analysis is also county and time fixed effects,
meaning that all time-invariant county-specific factors are accounted for, as well as time-
specific shocks or trend that are common to all counties. In order for the stimation
to show an effect of shootings, counties that experience shootings should thus after the
shooting deviate from their own pre-shooting average, in a way that is different from
how the other counties developed. Affected counties would, in the absence of a shooting,
have followed the same path. Moreover, Yousaf only includes counties that either have
experienced mass shootings at some point, or are neighbours of them.
However, as noted by Yousaf, if the unobserved process that causes mass shootings
is time-varying, the identifying assumption might not hold. Counties that experience
shootings today may be different from counties that did so in the past. This might be
very relevant in Sweden, given that shootings related to organized crime has increased
in prevalence only the last decade (Sturup, Rostami, et al. 2018). Yousaf’s solution is to
compare “failed” and “successful” mass shootings, and finds similar effects.
Several factors make the strategy employed by Yousaf inapplicable to this study.
First, it requires data over a longer period of time: Yousaf has data for over a decade,
with congressional elections every other years. The Swedish shootings data was only
systematically collected from 2011, and general elections only happen every four years.
The Sweden Democrats have also only been a political force to be reckoned with since
2006 or 2002.
Second, American mass shootings are decidedly more severe and violent than the
Swedish ones investigated here; fortunately almost none live up to the threshold of four
killed in one event. It is therefore likely that any effects of them will be more transient,
and not certain to persist years or several years after the event. In contrast, in Yousaf’s
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study, counties are treated as affected at all times after a shooting has taken place.
And finally, given the smaller intensity of the Swedish shootings, it is likely that effects
will be more limited geographically. The lowest level at which election data is available
is the precinct level, but the number of precinct and their boundaries are adjusted each
election, making tracking them over time difficult.
3.1 Identifying assumption
In this paper, I instead employ a pseudo-experimental design, using the timing of the
shooting in relation to the election as leverage. The identifying assumption is that in a
sufficiently small window of time, shootings are randomly distributed in time in relation
to the election. Therefore, election precincts where shootings took place just before an
election should be similar in all relevant aspects to precincts where shootings happened
just after an election. But only in the former precincts can the violence be taken into
account in the poll booth. Therefore, the latter precinct can be used as a control group.
Below, I substantiate this assumption.
3.2 Data
The main challenge is to acquire data on shootings. No national databases of gun violence
incidents exist, and crime statistics are not sufficicently granular either in time or in
location. Therefore, I have requested lists of “confirmed shootings” from regional police
departments in Sweden, which for the three major city regions are compiled since 2011,
and have received the data for all the police districts in the southern part of Sweden,
covering 74% of the population, including the three major cities. These record the date
and location of each shooting, with location given in either coordinates (long/lat or RT90
11











































































































or SWEREF coordinate systems) or adress. A problem for the sake of this study is that
the locations are ”washed” - the last digits of coordinates have been rounded off, and
only the names of streets are given, not specific numbers. The reason is that the police
wants to protect the identities of victims or bystanders affected by the shooting; precise
locations could otherwise lead to specific addresses. Furthermore, sometimes it is not
possible to ascertain the exact location of a shooting (Gerell 2018). As a consequence,
it is not meaningful to look at effects within small radii around shootings, since the
exact location is not known. In some cases, numbers of killed or wounded are given, but
coverage is far from complete, and the data is therefore not useful. In total, there are
1591 recorded shootings up until January 1st, 2019. Figure 1, which shows the number
of shootings per month, reveals the rising trend the last years.
Geographically, we can see that the shootings primarily are located to the regions
surrounding the cities: Combined, the three most populous municipalities of Stockholm,
Gothenburg and Malmö has had 995, 62.5% of the total. The shootings data is via GIS
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techniques assigned to the electoral precinct or zip codes in which they occured.
3.3 Do voters notice shootings?
An important question is whether shootings make a mark in the public conciousness
and the media. This study includes shootings where noone was killed or hurt, whereas
much of the american research have focused on much more violent episodes, with multiple
dead. It is thus far from certain that the Swedish electorate and media, while less de-
sensitized, will take notice of the shootings in the dataset. If not, there is still a chance
that shootings in the immediate vicinity of voters affects their attitudes. But if shootings
generally “make the news,” the expectation that they will have political effects is stronger.
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I have combined monthly data on the number of articles in Swedish print media that
mention the words “skjutning” (shooting) or “skottlossning” (gunfire) with Google trends
data on the intensity of searches on the same terms (calculated as the average of the two
search terms). The Google data is measured as a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents
peak interest in the term during the period January 2011 to December 2018.
Table 1: Analysis of the correlation between number of shootings, media reporting and








2012 3.781 50.416 2.534
(3.404) (61.587) (3.073)
2013 4.095 −14.471 4.453
(3.306) (59.814) (2.975)
2014 3.871 −53.578 5.197∗
(3.308) (59.842) (2.989)
2015 9.069∗∗∗ 45.349 7.947∗∗∗
(3.307) (59.834) (2.984)
2016 12.327∗∗∗ −20.700 12.839∗∗∗
(3.310) (59.882) (2.979)
2017 18.573∗∗∗ 59.863 17.092∗∗∗
(3.572) (64.626) (3.229)
2018 24.228∗∗∗ −0.213 24.233∗∗∗
(3.487) (63.088) (3.136)
Constant 1.333 421.910∗∗∗ −9.107∗∗
(3.386) (61.253) (3.785)
Observations 96 96 96
Adjusted R2 0.557 0.135 0.641
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1 shows the results of three regressions. In the first model, I regress the search
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data on the number of shootings (as well as year dummies). We can see that there is
an independent effect of the number of shootings each month on the intensity of google
searches on the subject, even when controlling for the general time trend. Shootings are
also related to the intensity of media reporting - each additional shooting is expected to
result in an additional 9 articles on the subject. Finally, when analyzing Google searches,
and including both media and actual shootings in the same model, the coefficient for
number of shootings is halved, and only media reporting retains its statistical significance.
Naturally, a large part of the effect of shootings on public conciousness is channeled
through media’s reporting. On the other hand, it is certainly so that media reports more
on violent and gruesome shootings. So the coefficient for media could also primarily be
picking up the severity of the shootings. Regardless, the analysis shows that the public
do take notice of shootings, at least on the national level.
3.4 Election data
Election data is accessed from the Swedish election authority. They provide shapefiles
over electoral districts, as well as vote tallies in each district, together with information
about the number of eligble voters. From this data I calculate the vote share for the
different parties, especially the Sweden democrats. Figure 3 shows the distribution of
vote shares in the districts in the parliamentary elections of 2014 (leftmost distribution)
and 2018 (rightmost). Reflecting the increase in national vote share from 5.6% to 10.2%,
the rightmost distribution is located higher on the scale, and even reaches upward towards
50% in some districts.
I also calculate the proportion of women in the electorate, and a proxy for the pro-
portion of immigrants. This last number is not directly available, but there is data on
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the number of foreign nationals that are eligible to vote in the local elections, for which
the requirement only is permanent residence of three years, not citizenship. While far
from perfect, it is likely that this variable is highly correlated both with the proportion
of immigrants and the proportion with immigrant background.
A problem for identification when comparing different districts is that the level of
violence may be an important factor in choices of where to live. Regardless of levels of
demographic covariates, people with a preference for more security might actively choose
to move out of the city. Otherwise similar areas might thus differ in the psychological
makeup of the citizenry.
For instance, in a survey of Gothenburg in 2016, the respondents least likely to agree
with the statement ”Gothenburg is a safe city” lived in the wealthy suburb of Torslanda,
at the coast. Respondents in Majorna-Linné, an area where crime rates are much higher,
were 20 percentage points more likely to agree with the statement. However, with the
design proposed here, all areas in the pseudo experiment are expected to have similar
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levels of violence, on average.
The news consumption of citizens is also naturally influenced by their preexisting
worries and priorities. Citizens worried about the consequences of immigration could
very well select into more news about crime that can plausibly be linked to immigration,
such as shootings. It is thus hard in cross-sectional designs to disentangle the effect of
actual violent crime on support for the Sweden Democrats. Information about shootings
in the immediate neighborhood that is the electoral precinct could in contrast travel by
word of mouth.
3.5 Balance
The assumption that precincts affected by shootings before and after the election are sim-
ilar becomes more credible the smaller the time window used, but the number of affected
precincts also diminishes. In Table 2, I categorize the precincts into four categories, de-
pending on whether they saw a shooting before or after the election, as well as neither or
both. The final category is important to exclude from the treatment group: respondents
there were affected by a shooting in advance of the election, but the precinct is also of a
different type than those only affected by a single shooting.
Table 2: Number of observations depending on time window
Shooting in relation to election:
Neither Before After Both
14 days 8490 17 26 1
30 days 8451 35 44 4
60 days 8382 59 82 11
90 days 8308 102 113 11
120 days 8249 135 134 16
With the smallest time windows, the number of observations in each of the two relevant
groups is too small for any credible analysis. A reasonable tradeoff here is the 90 days
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window, in which there are more than a hundred precincts in each group. Still, the
effect of a shooting on SD vote share will have to be substantial in order for the effect to
be detectable at conventional levels of statistical significance, about 2.5 to 3 percentage
points.
To test whether the precincts have similar characteristics, Table 3 presents mean
values of five covariates: Population, area, percentage men, percentage foreign citizens
and a dummy variable for whether there was at least one shooting in the district, in the
1000 days leading up to the start of the time window.
Table 3: Summary statistics
Neither Before After Both
n 7, 488 102 113 11
Population 1, 260.1 1, 316.4 1, 267.2 1, 293.3
Km2 26.7 6.2 5.5 1.9
% men 49.3 48.6 48.7 49.6
% foreign 7 12.8 12.2 21.3
Previous shootings 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.5
In general, the “before” and “after” precincts are more similar to each other than
to the “neither” or “both” precincts. For instance, the percentage of foreign citizens is
lower in the “neither” precincts, which are more often located outside of the big cities,
and higher in the “both” precincts, located in low-income areas of the big cities. None
of the differences between the “before” or “after” districts is statistically significant. The
maps of Figure 4 also show the seemingly random distribution of the before and after
precincts, often being located very close to each other.
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The main analysis is a comparison, with OLS regression, with SD vote share as the
outcome and exposure to shootings as the independent variable. More specifically, it
takes the form of the following equation:
V oteSDi = β0 + β1Beforeorafteri,w + β2Beforei,w + β3X + β4T + εi (1)
Where Beforeorafteri,w is an indicator that signifies that the precinct was exposed
to a shooting in in time window w before or after the time of the election, and where
Beforei,w is an indicator that the shooting happened before the election. The first term
thus signifies the precinct “being in the experiment” and the other that the precinct
was “treated.” X is a vector of dummy variables for the municipality of the precinct,
to account for local unobserved factors. T is a vector of dummy variables, one for each
election. The analysis is estimated with OLS regression.
3.7 The Swedish Citizen Panel
In order to further understand how shootings affect voters’ considerations, I also analyze
survey data from the Swedish Citizen Panel (Martinsson et al. 2019), a panel of respon-
dents, mainly recruited through non-probability methods, surveyed regularly since 2010.
New respondents are recruited continously, and answers are given over the internet. Some
general questions are asked regularly, including preferred party if there was an election
today, worry about organized crime, and opinion on refugee reception. Respondents are
also asked to describe the three most important current issues, in free text. I will analyze
this text data for occurence of certain words related to immigration and crime.
20
In order to determine whether respondents have been affected by a shooting in their
vicinity, I combine the geographical shooting data with data on the postal code of the
respondent. There are about 10,000 postal codes in Sweden, which means that they are
more fine-grained than the roughly 5,000 electoral precincts. Unfortunately, however,
respondents are generally only asked about their postal code of residence at the time of
recruitment into the Citizen Panel, and the data will thus be inaccurate for respondents
that move. Data exists on municipality of residence at each survey, but the municipal
division is too coarse in order to be relevant for testing the hypothesis, at least in the
larger cities where most shootings take place. To alleviate some of the problem, I restrict
the analysis to respondents whose stated postal code is located in the municipality of
residence at the time of the survey, even though this solution does not take care of the
problem of respondents moving within municipalities.
This data will be analyzed using a similar design as the election data, but based on
shootings’ relation to the times at which respondents answered the survey. Respondents
who answered before a shooting in their vicinity are the control group, and respondents
who answered after are the treated group. The idea is, again, that the timing of the
shooting is random in relation to the survey.
However, there are caveats when analyzing survey data with responses spread out
in time. Importantly, survey answers generally flow in with a diminishing pace, with
most surveys being answered immediately after it is sent out, or after reminders. This
is the case also with the Citizen Panel. Therefore, dividing respondents temporally will
on average result in more respondents answering a survey before a shooting, compared
to after. Moreover, they are likely to be different in other respects; as noted by Munoz,
Falco-Gimeno and Hernandez (2019), respondents that are harder to reach have a higher
21
probability of being interviewed after any event. I will therefore in the models control
for the respondent’s age, gender, country of birth (Sweden or abroad), and whether there
have been at least one shooting in the area before the treatment period. Table 3 shows
the descriptive statistics for covariates over four categories of respondents, depending on
the timing of the shooting in relation to the survey response.
Table 4: Summary statistics - citizen panel
Neither Before After Both
n 46, 531 286 364 29
Age 53.5 49.7 50.5 45.8
Woman 0.36 0.40 0.34 0.48
Educated 0.52 0.53 0.56 0.59
Foreign born 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.10
Previous shooting 0.05 0.75 0.22 0.62
A mitigating factor that might otherwise be present in studies of “unexpected events”
(Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno, and Hernández 2019) is that there are many shootings in the
dataset, which reduces the risk that differences between the control and treatment group
are driven by other contemporaneous events.
4 Results
As a first test, I in Figure 5 plot the average vote share of the Sweden Democrats in the
four types of precincts, without any controls, averaged over both elections. The similarity
between the before and after precincts is striking: in precincts that saw a shooting no
more than 90 days before the election, SD received 14.2 percent, and in precincts with a
shooting no more than 90 days after, SD received 14 percent. There is thus no substantial
effect of shootings here, looking at the raw numbers. Nonetheless, a true effect might be
hidden behind differences between municipalities or election years. I therefore proceed
22



















For the first analysis, I run five models. In the first model, the only independent vari-
able apart from the year and municipality fixed effects is a dummy variable indicating
that a shooting happened in the 90 windows preceding or following the election. The co-
efficient for the variable is negative, which shows that support for the Sweden Democrats
is lower in areas that are usually hit by shootings. In Model 2 the “treatment” variable
is added, the dummy for whether the shooting happened before the election. The coeffi-
cient for the variable is positive, as expected in the hypothesis, indicating that a shooting
that happens before the election is associated with a 0.5 percentage points increase in
support for the Sweden Democrats, but it is not statistically significant. The coefficient
also changes very little in models 3 and 4, where additional covariates are added. The
main consequence of introducing additional variables is that the coefficient for the “any
shooting” variable becomes weaker, as we to a higher degree can control for the charac-
teristics of the precinct. Notably, precincts with a higher share of immigrants both have
more shootings and weaker support for SD.
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Confidence intervals are quite wide - in the most basic model 2, it is for the Shooting
before election variable -0.543 to 1.583. We can thus not conclusively determine that
there is an effect, but it cannot be ruled out either.
Table 5: Regression results. Dependent variable: Sweden Democrats election result. 90
day window. District boundaries.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shooting happened −0.474∗ −0.703∗ −0.605 −0.279
(0.283) (0.378) (0.379) (0.360)
Shooting before election 0.505 0.487 0.582
(0.552) (0.552) (0.522)










Year 4.894∗∗∗ 4.896∗∗∗ 4.905∗∗∗ 4.911∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.094)
Observations 7,714 7,714 7,714 7,714
Adjusted R2 0.686 0.686 0.687 0.720
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Varying the time window in Table 6 does not substantially alter the conclusions. The
estimated coefficient for the treatment variable howvers around 0.5 regardless of whether
the time window is 60, 90 or 120 days. The shortest window, 30 days, yields a negative
coefficient, but there are then fewer than 50 observations in each category (see Table 2)
and the confidence interval ranges from -3.038 to 2.343.
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Table 6: Main analysis with different time windows, District boundaries
Window:
30 days 60 days 90 days 120 days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shooting −0.013 −0.806∗ −0.636∗ −0.544
(0.591) (0.428) (0.373) (0.341)
Before election −0.535 0.400 0.503 0.443
(0.902) (0.675) (0.542) (0.481)
Previous shootings −0.417∗∗ −0.380∗∗ −0.427∗∗ −0.469∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.167) (0.171) (0.174)
Observations 8,534 8,534 8,534 8,534
Adjusted R2 0.675 0.675 0.675 0.675
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
4.1 Interaction analysis
Two possible interactions are worth exploring. First, whether shootings have similar
effects in districts that have different number of immigrants. If the number of immigrants
is high, there is possibly little demand for an anti-immigration party to begin with.
Second, inhabitants of districts that see many shootings are perhaps jaded, and affected
less by an additional shooting than residents in areas which are unaccustomed to displays
of violence. I therefore in Table 7 interact both the control and treatment variables with
first the proportion of immigrants, and then the dummy variable for whether there was a
shooting in the precinct in the preceding years. Neither of the relevant interaction terms
for “Shooting before election” are statistically significant.
4.2 Other parties
To further explore the possible political consequences of the shootings, I set the election
results of all the other parties represented in parliament as the dependent variable and
apply the same model. All models include year and municipality fixed effects. Results
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Table 7: Regression results. Dependent variable: Sweden Democrats election result. 90
day window. District boundaries.
(1) (2) (3)
Shooting happened −0.703∗ 1.112 −0.186
(0.378) (0.688) (0.467)






2018 4.896∗∗∗ 4.934∗∗∗ 4.904∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099)
Shooting happened * Perc. foreign −0.123∗∗∗
(0.045)
Shooting before election * Perc. foreign −0.049
(0.069)
Shooting happened * Previous shootings −1.206
(0.794)
Shooting before election * Previous shootings 1.746
(1.169)
Constant 12.481∗∗∗ 13.016∗∗∗ 12.527∗∗∗
(0.589) (0.596) (0.589)
Observations 7,714 7,714 7,714
Adjusted R2 0.686 0.689 0.687
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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are presented in Table 6. While the dummy variables for any shooting, and shooting
in the previous period show expected patterns - parties on the left do better in more
violent areas - there are no significant effects of the treatment variable, shooting before
the election. The strongest coefficients are for the Social Democrats (0.625) and the
Sweden Democrats (0.503). Notably, the coefficient for the result on the conservative
party is negative, in contrast to what one could expect if shootings raise the saliency of
the law and order issue.
Table 8: Main analysis on all parties. 90 day window
Party:
Left Soc. dem Green Centre Lib Chr. dem Cons Swe. dem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Shooting 1.117∗∗∗ 6.970∗∗∗ −0.362∗ −1.239∗∗∗ −1.227∗∗∗ −0.794∗∗∗ −3.758∗∗∗ −0.605
(0.366) (0.875) (0.207) (0.297) (0.214) (0.207) (0.714) (0.379)
Before election −0.165 0.632 −0.121 −0.131 −0.154 −0.050 −0.627 0.487
(0.532) (1.272) (0.301) (0.431) (0.311) (0.301) (1.039) (0.552)
Previous shootings 2.073∗∗∗ 8.813∗∗∗ −0.727∗∗∗ −1.607∗∗∗ −1.771∗∗∗ −0.746∗∗∗ −5.595∗∗∗ −0.451∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.402) (0.095) (0.136) (0.098) (0.095) (0.329) (0.175)
Observations 7,714 7,714 7,714 7,714 7,713 7,714 7,714 7,714
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.273 0.562 0.410 0.416 0.467 0.346 0.687
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.3 Citizen panel
A possible interpretation of the null findings is that these events might affect perceptions
of crime or the consequences of immigration, without translating into different party
choices. Election results can not tell us anything about whether that is the case. There-
fore, I now turn to analysis of the Citizen Panel data. First, I run an analysis on the
relationship between worry about organized crime (1 = “Not at all worried” to 5 = “Very
worried”) and support for the different parties.
Table 9: Effect of crime attitude on party support. Municipality and survey wave fixed
effects.
Party:
Left Soc. dem Green Centre Lib Chr. dem Cons Swe. dem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Worry crime −0.056∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.004∗ 0.0005 0.004∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Age −0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.001∗∗∗ −0.00003 0.002∗∗∗ 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Woman 0.083∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Educated 0.017∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ −0.005 −0.096∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Foreign born 0.003 −0.006 −0.019 −0.033∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.001 −0.003 0.033∗∗
(0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.021 0.024 0.026 0.012 0.018 0.020 0.144
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The results show consistent and strong effects of attitudes towards crime on sup-
port for the different parties, with the strongest effect being obtained for the Sweden
Democrats: For each step up on the worry scale, support for SD is expected to increase
with about eight percentage points. The question then is whether shootings increase the
28
worry about crime.
In Table 10 I replicate the main analysis on survey data, where stated support for
the Sweden Democrats are regressed on the two variables indicating whether there was a
shooting 90 days before or after the survey, and whether it happened before the survey.
Thereafter, control variables are introduced in models 3 and 4.
Table 10: Main analysis with controls. 90 day window.
Dependent variable: SD support.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shooting −0.006 0.008 0.007 0.003
(0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Before survey −0.033 −0.037 −0.034
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)










Observations 47,210 47,210 47,210 46,919
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.060
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
As with the analysis of the election results, we can see no significant effect of being
exposed to a shooting in the postal code area on support for the Sweden Democrats; in
fact, the coefficient is negative. Even though there were issues of balance related to the
nature of data collection in surveys, the coefficient for the main variable is not affected by
the addition of respondent characteristics as control variables in model 4: older people
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and foreign-born suppport the Sweden democrats more, while women and the highly
educated do so to a lesser extent.
Repeating the analysis on all the parties in Table 11, we can see that the traditional
centre-right parties do worse in postal codes where there have been shootings within the
1000 days leading up to the survey, and the left party does better, reflecting the different
demographical make-up of the different postal code areas. However, there are no reliable
estimated effects of the “Shooting before survey” variable, with the possible exception of
teh Green Party. But the coefficient is only significant at the 90 percent level, and given
the many tests in the table, should not be assigned too much importance.
Table 11: Main analysis on all parties. Citizen panel. 90 day window.
Party:
Left Soc. dem Green Centre Lib Chr. dem Cons Swe. dem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Shooting 0.038∗∗ −0.030 0.012 −0.017 −0.0004 −0.0001 −0.030 0.007
(0.019) (0.021) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.020) (0.020)
Before survey 0.019 0.050 −0.032∗ 0.030 −0.028 0.009 0.026 −0.037
(0.028) (0.031) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.014) (0.030) (0.030)
Previous shooting 0.055∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.004 −0.011∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 47,210 47,210 47,210 47,210 47,210 47,210 47,210 47,210
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.018 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.018
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
4.4 Issues and salience
But the main advantage of the Citizen Panel data was that it allows us to dig deeper in
the underlying attitudes. Given that the analysis in Table 9 showed that worry about
crime increased support for the Sweden democrats, the results suggest that shootings have
little effect on attitudes. But to be sure, I first analyze how shootings affect responses to
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two survey questions: First, to what extent the respondent is worried about organized
crime and second, what the respondent thinks of a proposal to accept fewer refugees in
Sweden (1 = “Very bad” to 5 = “Very good”). Models are estimated with the same
control variables as in the previous analysis.
Table 12: Issue analysis. 90 day window.
Issue:




Before survey 0.017∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)







Adjusted R2 0.075 0.135
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
No discernible effects can be found of the treatment variable, and the coefficients are
negative, in contrast to the hypothesis. The control variables in contrast yield expected
effects: Older respondents are more worried about organized crime and want to accept
fewer refugees, while the opposite is true for respondents with a college education. Women
are more supportive of refugee reception, but also worry more about organized crime than
men.
Finally, to see if shootings raise the saliency of issues of crime or immigration, I analyze
the free text responses to the question of what the most important problems facing the
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Swedish society are. To this end, I have created six dummy variables that check whether
the respondent mentioned a specific text string in their response. The five words are
“invandr” (immigr), “krimi” (crimi), “skjut” (shoot), “flykt” (refug), “migra” (migra)
and, as a comparison, “rasism” (racism). Again, there are no statistically significant
effects of the “shooting before survey” variable, lending support to the conclusion that
an additional shooting catalogued in this dataset do not make much of an impact on
voters and survey respondents.
Table 13: Word analysis. 90 day window.
Word:
’invandr’ ’krimi’ ’skjut’ ’flykt’ ’migra’ ’rasism’
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shooting 0.007 −0.005 −0.0001 −0.004 −0.001 0.003
(0.006) (0.003) (0.0004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003)
Before survey −0.016∗ −0.004 −0.0001 −0.004 0.002 0.003
(0.009) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Previous shooting 0.0004 0.001 0.00004 0.003∗∗ −0.0004 0.004∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001)
Age 0.0001∗∗∗ −0.00004∗∗ 0.00000 0.00002 0.00002∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00000) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00002)
Woman −0.012∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.005∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001)
Educated −0.018∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.0001∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001)
Foreign born 0.002 0.002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001)
Observations 95,393 95,393 95,393 95,393 95,393 95,393
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.011 0.001 0.018 0.0001 0.013
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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5 Conclusion
When a young mother, holding her baby, was shot point blank in the head in the middle
of the street of Malmö in August 2019, there was a public outcry of anger and frustration.
Many politicans expressed their dismay, but one of the more noteworthy quotes came from
the party leader of the Sweden Democrats, Jimmie Åkesson. Accused by an opponent
of trying to politicize the event, Åkesson stated that ”This is something my party has
warned of for a long time. I have the right to point fingers, and I intend to do so.”
Given the strong emphasis of the Sweden Democrats and other “radical right” parties
on crime and issues of law and order, it is reasonable to expect that incidents of public
violence will increase the saliency of the issue and support for these parties.
In this paper, I have leveraged a pseudo-experimental design, where election precincts
and survey respondents exposed to shootings in the vicinity in advance of an election or
survey are contrasted to counterparts that were exposed to similar incidents, but after the
election or survey. Somewhat surprisingly, shootings does not appear to impact neither
election results, nor do they impact expressed support for parties, nor attitudes towards
crime or immigration, and does not increase the saliency of the same issues.
Methodological explanations for the null finding might be low power in the analyses:
about 200 precincts and about 500 survey respondents constitute the identifying obser-
vations. There might be effects, but too weak to be detectable. Another possibility is
that not all shootings have an effect, only the ones where someone is killed. Data on
fatalities is however incomplete, and fatalities are likely too few to work in the design.
Alternatively, it might be the case that none of the shootings fail to make an impact on a
desensitized public: several studies have found only weak effects of horrific mass murders
in the United States.
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A more substantial explanation is instead that voters are affected by shootings, but
not specifically those that happen in their vicinity, but rather the high-profile events such
as the murder of the mother described at the beginning of this section. Some incidents
become highly publicized and fuel political debate, others pass under the radar. For
instance, the analysis of Google search data and media coverage indicated that media
reporting on the subject was a more important determinant of search interest than the
actual number of shootings. Similarly, even though previous research has demonstrated
that victimization is a strong determinant of fear of future crime, fear of crime in groups
is inversely related to victimization rates of the group as a whole (Rueda and Stegmueller
2016).
All in all, the results of this paper demonstrate that while crime is an important
part of the rhetoric of radical right parties, it is far from certain that actual crime is an
important determinant of support for said parties.
34
References
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